Structured File System) are aimed to provide security and confidentiality. Current deployments of such File Systems do not ensure integrity of the encrypted data that is stored on disk. Due to Kernel bugs, racing conditions and arbitrary dead-locks, CLFS data on the disc can be damaged and also there is always the possibility that system users can modify the encrypted data. That's why, we considered essential to modify the way keys are stored in the system, as their safe storage is a clue point to the whole protection this system assures. Implementing a Trusted Platform Module is our suggestion to the case. So in this secure environment, our aims lies towards ensuring data integrity on CLFS without compromising the overall performance. This paper considers the standard data verification methods, with the main goal to overcome one of its major limitations, low performance of File System check-summing. CLFS matches our performance expectations, as it performs close enough to noncryptographic file systems. To improve the performance of the check-summing process we try to study and examine various design choices and propose metadata check-summing. Several tests are made to prove that this added functionality does not significantly affect performance.
INTRODUCTION
A file system is meant to store typically large amounts of data, which may be either critical or sensitive, so they need to be protected. Modern File Systems, such as CLFS [1] ensure confidentiality of data, encrypting them. Usually File Systems that comprise data encryption result to perform considerably slower than non-cryptographic File Systems. New techniques implemented in CLFS manage to reach its performance goals, as they go close to fast local file systems. Encryption is a native characteristic of this file system and it ensures that information is accessible only to those authorized to have access, while not being affected by the overhead of encryption with more than an order of magnitude. Being native means including the data encryption code into the file system code. We are generally used to systems, where encryption is added as a layer, thus allowing it to be bypassed, but this is not our case, as Figure 1 demonstrates.
We consider CLFS an efficient cryptographic file system, one worth working on and trying to improve. Further analysis has spotted its main drawbacks, where we will concentrate. These actually reside in two main points, the lack of data integrity and the lack of secure techniques implementation during the key storing processes. Although confidentiality is an important part of the overall system storage security, it is not everything. Considering hard disks malfunctioning, data on it can be damaged even though it is encrypted. It can also be affected by attackers, both physically or while communicating over an insecure network. Physical access on disk allows the attacker to change the unencrypted part, which in our case comprises the ifile, without the system knowing it. Thus, suggesting a way to make the file system immune from such data corruption, either as a result of a malicious attack or hardware failure, is our scope. We aim to protect our sensitive data, checking for inconsistencies, to obtain data integrity.
The second important drawback resides on the lack of security in the storage of cryptographic keys. Currently the system is based on software solutions, as it uses the common passphrase to protect the key. We implement a solution, which uses hardware aid, the trusted platform model [2] to securely store keys. Being TMP [3] its main component, that's where we will focus. TCP has been proposed and successfully adopted in various analog scenarios [4] . We believe it will be efficient even in our system, as it resulted with an overhead of only 0.3% in Jin et al. [5] , which discusses a similar encrypted 978-963-8111-77-7 storage system. The difference between the above systems and ours is that CLFS overweighs them in performance. However, our objective will be reached if the overhead's percentage is lower than 10%, as this will not be absolutely detectable by the user, so it is more than acceptable.
The following paragraphs of this paper will be organized as follows. First we will describe the context of our working environment, Cryptographic Log Structured File System, which is in turn based on LFS [6] . This work comes to life to improve this file system, thus a detailed explanation of the techniques it uses to avoid the latency encryption carries, is needed. Further we will go deeper into the trusted platform module, to point out the benefits of its involvement into our system. After that, a list of the techniques used to achieve the integrity of data requirement will be unfolded. They will be examined in a selective prospective, to pick out the most congruent solution to our specific case, as Figure 2 brings to attention. In this section, we consider important to unfold the features of the Cryptographic Log-Structured File System, to justify our choice. To make a long story short, the crucial argument that supports CLFS is performance. Previous cryptographic file systems come in different implementation, the encryption can be block based, as well as disk based, on network file systems or stackable ones. Their common characteristic is bumping into the knot of being too CPU sensitive. To provide performance solutions CLFS concentrates on previous cryptographic File Systems weaknesses, being the speed of the encryption algorithm used and the writing latency.
A. The encytion algorithm
CLFS considered that improving the speed of the algorithm used to encrypt would be useful both ways of read and write operations. Let's take a look at a couple of the most known cryptographic file systems, to check out for their deficiencies.
Blaze (1993) [7] implemented CFS as a network file system and its main drawback resulted the continuous context switching overhead. A completely different approach was treated by Zadok (1998) in CryptFS [8] , as it is a stackable file system. This provides it with portability allowing execution above any kind of native file system. It also comes out to be faster than CFS by a factor that fluctuates from 2 to 37 times. The bottleneck of this file system is precisely the encryption algorithm it uses, blowfish.
The algorithm used in CLFS is SEAL 3.0 [9] . It is used exactly to surpass the knot a non efficient algorithm brings to the system. This is achieved by utilizing two major characteristics of the algorithm, namely speed and precomputation. The tests made by P. Rogaway and D. Coppersmith demonstrated that SEAL uses approximately 4 cycles to process a byte and results up to 10 times faster than DES. SEAL works as a stream cipher, where the encryption depends not only from the plain text and the encryption key, but also from the position of the data. The key is 160bit long and SEAL uses it to map a 32bit string to one composed of L bit, where L is less than 64KB. The trick that makes the work with SEAL that fast is pre-computation. Being LFS the ground upon which CLFS was built, allows us to know precisely the position of the next write and that's the reason why we can precompute the whole key stream, so that the encryption process is reduced to a simple XOR operation between the key and the plain text.
B. The underlying file system
The speed of I/O bound applications is limited by the write performance of the file system. A log-structured file system is designed for high write throughput. Rosenblum and Ousterhout designed e file system with a relatively different behavior from its predecessors. They introduced the idea of a continuous log, where data and metadata are written. The majority of file systems put a great emphasis on spatial locality and transform their data without changing its location, which leads to slow seeks. LFS assumes that taking care of locality will no longer be effective, as cache memory size is increasing to the extends of satisfying all read operations. Storing data in a log avoids seeks, therefore minimizes the movement of disk's head and maximizes write throughput.
The benefits of using it as a base for CLFS is that we know where the position of the next write is located. Besides, file system writes are only performed at the end of the log which means that inconsistencies can only be located in the last segment of the log, which greatly speeds up crash recovery.
C. (C)LFS organization
The Cryptographic Log Structured File System is very similar to LFS, as much as concerns its overall format. Its building blocks are divided into segments, which in turn become active, as shown in Figure 3 . The initial part of each of these segments consists of the so called summary block. This structure is composed of a set of pointers that indicate the position of the successive summary block. That is how the idea of a continuous log is implemented in LFS.
Upon creation of the file system a random key is automatically generated for the first segment. Afterwards the segment key and the key stream offset are stored encrypted in the corresponding segment summaries. The key stream is calculated increasing it with the segment size. To increase performance CLFS uses a cache to store the expanded keys and their positions. In a read operation CLFS would initially act the same as LFS, by searching for the desired block to read. The search would start by the index file's inode stored in the superblock, where we would find the inode map, followed from the inode. These operations are the majority of times bypassed, since this data are stored in the cache. Obviously, CLFS to ensure effective encryption cannot stop at the point of LFS. It has to read the exact position of the segment summary from the ifile. After reading it, decrypt the segment key and the key offset, to generate the key stream. Finally the read data has to be XORed with the key stream to decrypt them.
The write operation differs from LFS only in a couple of steps. The first chunk of data is removed from the list and its key is already known, so we can perform the XOR operation. This is done with all the chunks of data and afterwards the segment summary is changed.
III. KEY MANAGEMENT DISPOSAL
As previously mentioned, our goal is building security facilities on a fast Cryptographic Log-Structured File System. The second step to increased security is dealing with key management mechanisms. This issue is one of the most challenging, but a successful process is crucial and of course shouldn't be neglected. This is due to the fact that encryption is not an undefeatable solution to security. To mention here that it doesn't solve access problems, neither data corruption issues. These problems can be caused by an outrageous number of factors, considering the increasing scale of security threats, coming from malicious attacks.
A. Trusted computing technology
The current deployment of CLFS holds up on a usersupplied passphrase to protect the encryption keys, but research has concluded that a merely software approach is not enough to security. A way out of this has bloomed in the recent years and is gaining market access. It consists on searching for reliability into a hardware, which is equipped with trusted components, called a trusted platform.
Building a trusted platform certainly requires adding extra hardware modules, if they already aren't part of the architecture. Whereas, logically these platforms are constructed in various layers and components. The main one is TPM (Trusted Platform Module), which is intended to provide integrity, i.e. the system acting as it is expected. To achieve this the platform has the so called, roots of trust. Their integrity cannot be proven in any way, that's the reason why they have to be assumed as trusted modules. The roots of trust comprise the RTM (Root of Trust for Measurements), RTS (Root of Trust for Storage) and RTR (Root of Trust for Reporting). These are the base components upon which a whole secure platform is set.
B. Managing keys through Trusted Platforms
We overviewed Trusted Computer Platforms because that is what we are going to use to manage the storage of encryption keys. The trusted platform module, is created to safely save cryptographic keys. This means that attempting to access the key must pass through logging into TMP.
Having a trusting hardware environment, will give us two main advantages: protected capabilities and shielded memory locations. This means we are equipped with memory locations, where storing is considered to be secure and we can utilize capabilities like cryptographic key management and random numbers generation. This is shown in Figure 4 . Ensuring data integrity is fundamental to computer systems. Several factors may induce to data errors, to mention media failures, kernel bugs and racing conditions. Even an attacker who has reached to gain administrator privileges can modify the data. Threats are multidirectional and our system cannot be left unprotected, so our approach is based on the existing cryptographic file system to which the integrity checking capability is added.
A. Mirroring
Making exact copies of our data, i.e. mirroring, can be a way of managing it reliably. The process would comprise the comparison of our data with the mirrored one, before operating with it, as in Figure 5 . This method would easily detect changes in one of the replicas, providing integrity in case the changes occur because of hardware malfunctioning. Figure 5 . The mirroring technique, data are stored in two different locations However, it doesn't tell which of the copies is the genuine one. It is not able to perform correctly in the case of an intruder, either. This is due to the fact that both of the replicas can be changed, so that the system lacks the tools to detect intrusion and integrity is not obtained. The inefficiency of this method also arises when we consider the storage space it requires and the time we need to spend checking both replicas.
B. Parity
Parity is a simple yet effective method to assure integrity protection. The procedure is as follows: one bit is added to the stream, as shown in Figure 6 . The condition on this added bit is to be the equal to the binary sum of the bits. These parity bits are able to detect only single errors, which makes this technique primitive. We would get a result where a stream with two errors is considered valid. This definitely doesn't fulfill our security requirements. Figure 6 . The parity technique, the parity bit added to a bit pattern.
C. Check-summing
Check-sums are exactly the same as parity with two changes: to create the check-sum of a pattern of entities of length n bits, an n-bit entity (the check-sum) is added and the binary sum of the entities and the check-sum is constrained to be zero. This is shown in Figure 7 . CRC is more secure than check-summing, but it needs more calculation, as it adopts a more complex technique. Checksums can be implemented in various ways, we can compute a per block check-sum, or a per file check-sum. The latter proposes two alternatives, storing check-sums apart from the data, otherwise interleaving data files and check-sums with the purpose of making more efficient use of data locality.
D. CRC
CRC is a method which seeks to improve on check-sums by increasing the complexity of the arithmetic. The idea is to calculate the cyclic redundancy check by using polynomial division and not just a simple binary sum, as we previously saw in the check-sum algorithm. The stream of bits is divided by a binary number used as a coefficient. However, this added complexity does not fit within our system and that is the reason we are not going to concentrate on the topic.
V. OUR APPROACH
To constitute our design model we have developed our idea in several layers, each of which is built on answering one single question per layer. As we previously explained ensuring data verification in a file system is essential to its integrity. On the other hand we need to preserve as much as possible the major advantage of our native file system CLFS, which despite being cryptographic fully meets performance requirements. So, naturally the decisions we need to make involve which method of verification is more appropriate, what part of the data will be verified unless all of it, where will this extra information be stored and finally how frequently the verification will occur. Let's analyze them further.
A. The method used to provide data integrity
Check-summing is the most common method to ensure data integrity [10] . If we want our data to be protected from intruders as well as from transient errors, the check-sum need to be protected with a secure hashing scheme such as SHA1 [11] .
We considered efficient to compute check-sums for metadata. It comprises all the inodes and the ifile. Checking different fields of the metadata will allow us to find out if any malicious modification has been made to the data, because almost any modification to our data will be reflected to the metadata [12] . Furthermore, this decision is more advantageous as the amount of metadata is considerably less than data, and results to be efficient on timing, hence giving a better performance.
B. Benchmark of improved CLFS under stres tests using Tar and Compilation
Knuttson (2002), after implementing his cryptographic File System, made several tests to check its performance affected by the overhead encryption introduced. It resulted to perform close to non-cryptographic File-Systems, being an ideal solution for systems which store large amounts of sensitive data. Now, apart from encryption we have added a new feature, file integrity checking, through metadata check-summing. We need to test our system to evaluate the latency, this further overhead cause. The tests made are on a .tar file and also tying a kernel compilation. We have submitted four different file sizes, respectively 100MB, 250MB, 500MB and 1GB.
Knuttson tar tests completed in approximately 562s for a 64MB file. Our 100MB file completed in 927s, as shown in Figure 8 . Whereas, Figure 9 shows the comparison of the two systems during a compilation test. They are all composed of a great number of small files and this test was chosen considering it is a very frequent operation in a file system. Its overhead reached a 6%.
After a comparative analysis of the tests, we notice that the overhead reaches the margins of 4% on compilation tests and 6% on tar tests. The first is due to the fact that compilation is a CPU bound application and is not particularly affected by the File System, whereas the latter is slightly affected. We also have to emphasize that the gap between the two graphs is due to the long time this test needs to complete given such file sizes. Figure 9 . Results of the compilation test, the time of compilation of four different sized files, after adding integrity checking to metadata. After calculation the overhead results a mere 4%.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Trying to add integrity to a cryptographic File System, like CLFS, initially sounds risky from the performance point of view, but choosing the most appropriate method and a reduced amount of data to check is the clue to success.
We also managed to address the key storing security issue, by adding a secure platform in which we trust. This hardware solution overweighs previous exclusively software ones.
Our benchmark showed an overhead that varies from 4-6%. This is an appealing result, considering the systems where CLFS is intended to work. We provided secure key storage and highly secure metadata integrity checking, i.e. the data stored in our system are correct, or at least cannot be modified undetectably.
We assumed that checking the integrity of both data and metadata would considerably affect performance, while not evidently improving integrity. Metadata check-summing was considered sufficient to meet our requirements. But, in spite of this, further work can be done on testing what this overhead would exactly be.
As a conclusion, we successfully managed to add a reliable hardware environment and to improve a cryptographic file system, enabling it with integrity without sacrificing performance.
